But all propositions of logic say the same thing. That is, nothing.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). copy citation

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Author Ludwig Wittgenstein
Source Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Topic logic proposition
Date 1921
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by C. K. Ogden
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf

Context

“That from a fact p an infinite number of others should follow, namely, ~~p, ~~~~p, etc., is indeed hardly to be believed, and it is no less wonderful that the infinite number of propositions of logic (of mathematics) should follow from half a dozen «primitive propositions».
But the propositions of logic say the same thing. That is, nothing.
5.44 OGD [→GER | →P/M] Truth-functions are not material functions.
If e.g. an affirmation can be produced by repeated denial, is the denial—in any sense—contained in the affirmation? Does «~~p» deny ~p, or does it affirm p; or both?” source

Meaning and analysis

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