“ Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain ”
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677). copy citation
| Author | Baruch Spinoza |
|---|---|
| Source | Ethics |
| Topic | remembrance pain |
| Date | 1677 |
| Language | English |
| Reference | |
| Note | Translated by R. H. M. Elwes |
| Weblink | http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm |
Context
“Proof.—This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves feel pain.
Note.—This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked:”
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