is more and more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable.
 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677). copy citation

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Author Baruch Spinoza
Source Ethics
Topic action fame
Date 1677
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm

Context

“no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.) , and on the contrary (III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable. PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason. Proof.—Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.) . But, in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, his power” source