“ The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses ”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (c. 334 BC - 330 BC). copy citation
| Author | Aristotle |
|---|---|
| Source | Nicomachean Ethics |
| Topic | goodness reasoning |
| Date | c. 334 BC - 330 BC |
| Language | English |
| Reference | |
| Note | Translated by W. D. Ross |
| Weblink | http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt |
Context
“for or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency;”
source
