PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.
 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677). copy citation

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Author Baruch Spinoza
Source Ethics
Topic evil future
Date 1677
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm

Context

“Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it (IV. Q.E.D.
PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.
ix. Proof.—Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application).” source