Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues.
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1274). copy citation

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Author Thomas Aquinas
Source Summa Theologica
Topic action virtue
Date 1274
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/17897/pg17897-images.html

Context

“Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.
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