Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1274). copy citation

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Author Thomas Aquinas
Source Summa Theologica
Topic choice virtue
Date 1274
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/17897/pg17897-images.html

Context

“But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. 9, A. 1) . Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes mos in the sense of custom. Reply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1) . Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty:” source