“ How far, and in what sense, can action which is determined by motives be said to be free? For a long time the advocates of free-will, in their eagerness to preserve moral responsibility, went so far as to deny all motives as influencing moral action. ”

“ Since, however, the evidence of ordinary consciousness almost always goes to prove that the individual, especially in relation to future acts, regards himself as being free within certain limitations to make his own choice of alternatives, many determinists go so far as to admit that there may be in any action which is neither reflex nor determined by external causes solely an element of freedom. This view is corroborated by the phenomenon of remorse, in which the agent feels that he ought to, and could, have chosen a different course of action. ”

“ It may be held that every action is causally connected not only externally with the sum of the agent’s environment, but also internally with his motives and impulses. In other words, if we could know exactly all these conditions, we should be able to forecast with mathematical certainty the course which the agent would pursue. In this theory the agent cannot be held responsible for his action in any sense. It is the extreme antithesis of Indeterminism or Indifferentism, the doctrine that a man is absolutely free to choose between alternative courses (the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) . ”