Byron White

“ Rather that case makes clear that two particular kinds of challenges to state criminal statutes warrant extraordinary intervention in a State's criminal processes. They are planned prosecutorial misuse of a statute regulating freedom of expression and a vagueness attack on such a statute. Where threats of enforcement are without any expectation of conviction and are 'part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass,' it is obvious that defense in a state criminal prosecution will not suffice to avoid irreparable injury. ”

“ The Court, at the outset, fully and explicitly accepted the teaching of the cases 'that federal interference with a State's good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework' and that 'the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings.' 380 U.S., at 484-485, 85 S.Ct., at 1120. ”

“ For 'those affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the burdens of defending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering out the structure of the statute piecemeal, with no likelihood of obviating similar uncertainty for others.' Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S., at 491, 85 S.Ct., at 1123. To relegate the party to defense in a state proceeding would be likely to leave standing a statute susceptible of having a severe in terrorem effect on expression, even if one prosecuted under such a statute is not convicted. ”