George Sutherland

“ It cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of the contracting parties that one rate of fare should be charged for passage in one direction and a different rate in the opposite direction, for the same distance, over the same line, under the same conditions and entailing the same service. Such a construction of the clause would subvert the plain purpose of the ordinance, which was to fix a five-cent fare between the two cities. We construe the phrase 'from * * * College Park to * * * Atlanta' as though it read 'between College Park and Atlanta.' See State v. ”

“ Stone, 20 R. I. 269, 38 Atl. 654. This construction, moreover, agrees with the practice of the appellant, extending over many years in charging the same fare in each direction.
The decree of the state Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause r manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. ”