John Marshall Harlan II

“ The sole authority that might be thought to stand in the way of reading the Jones Act to embrace the residence definition of § 1391 (c) is Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787. A consideration of the setting in which that decision was made reveals that it must be taken as limited to the particular question of statutory construction presented there. Fourco concerned the interrelation of § 1391 (c) and the special venue provision governing patent infringement suits, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (b) (1964 ed.) . ”

“ Nor does the § 1391 (c) provision come into conflict with 'principal office,' unless that provision is deemed to have been restrictive in its origins, a proposition for which no support can be found.↑ It reads: 'Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.'
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105) . ”

“ The venue provision was added by the House-Senate Conference Committee, see H.R.Rep. No. 1107, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1920) .↑ We do not think these conclusions are vitiated by the fact that application of the wider residence definition of § 1391 (c) to the Jones Act makes the alternative 'principal office' venue provision of the latter statute superfluous as regards corporate employers. That provision continues to serve its original purpose when the defendant employer is not a corporation. ”