Ketanji Brown Jackson

“ I write to emphasize the relatively low burden that is “materiality” for purposes of Brady and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984) . To prove prejudice under both Brady and Strickland, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability” of a different outcome. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 82 (2004) ; United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) . We have repeatedly said that the “reasonable probability” standard is not the same as the “more likely than not” or “preponderance of the evidence” standard ”

“ Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals said that Washington was the “key” and “main” witness against Chinn. State v. Chinn, 2001–Ohio–1550, 2001 WL 788402, *2, *8 (July 13, 2001) . Yet, when confronted during state postconviction proceedings with the State’s suppression of evidence that would have substantially impeached this key witness, the Ohio courts suddenly concluded that evidence was not “material” enough to have affected the trial. ”