Supreme Court of the United States

“ The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own precedent is wrong. If I were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree. But that call is not within our bailiwick. Our job is to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision is defensible, and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in making that judgment. Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare, and this is not one. ”

“ Cruz’s case, however, raised a question of first impression: whether a “significant change” occurs when an intervening decision reaffirms existing law, but rectifies an erroneous application of that law. That was the effect of Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam) , which corrected the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion) , and its progeny. An intervening decision like Lynch, which undisputedly did not change any legal doctrine, has no analog in Arizona’s Rule 32.1 (g) jurisprudence. ”

“ Straightforward application of these principles should have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “significant change in the law” under Rule 32.1 (g) . Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent. Before Lynch, Arizona courts held that capital defendants were not entitled to inform the jury of their parole ineligibility. After Lynch, Arizona courts recognize that capital defendants have a due process right to provide the jury with that information when future dangerousness is at issue. It is hard to imagine a clearer break from the past. ”