Thomas Aquinas

“ Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a kind of justice."
I answer that, As stated above (Q [48] ) , a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident. ”

“ Whether it is a part of justice?
Art. 1 - Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue? Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" is not a virtue. ”

“ Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5) , "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}] . Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) , modesty is a part of temperance. ”