Tom C. Clark

“ Assuming that the intended use test first appeared as a commodity description technique after appellant's predecessor obtained his permit, we think the Commission still free to interpret the permit as it has done. Its determination accords with the common, ordinary meaning of the words used, and in no way strains or artificializes that meaning. [10] If the controverted words fairly lend themselves now to the construction made here, they always have done so. Consequently, any retroactive application of the intended use test could work no prejudice to appellant ”

“ Appellant argues that the intended use of the goods is of no consequence here because (1) intended use restrictions are never applied to commodity descriptions by reference to place of sale, and (2) intended use restrictions were developed by the Commission long after issuance of Nelson's permit and cannot now be applied retroactively. Finally, having offered evidence of a much more extensive grandfather operation than was set out in Nelson's application and affidavits, appellant contends that the Commission erred in excluding such evidence. ”

“ Andrew Nelson v. United States
Argued: Dec. 11, 1957. --- Decided: March 3, 1958
This appeal concerns the scope of a contract carrier permit granted appellant by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the 'grandfather clause' of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. [1] The Commission interpreted 'stock in trade of drug stores,' a commodity description in appellant's permit, to authorize carriage of only those goods which at time of movement are, or are intended to become, part of the stock in trade of a drugstore. ”