Summary

William Strong Hitchcock v. Galveston — Opinion of the Court

Grading a street or making a sidewalk, where none had existed before, is a special improvement, not like repairs of constant recurrence. By another article of defendant's charter, the city council was authorized to provide by ordinance special funds for special purposes, and to make the same disbursable only for the purpose for which the fund was created. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the limitation upon the power of the council to borrow for general purposes did not make the agreement with the plaintiffs invalid.
Source: Wikisource

William Strong Hitchcock v. Galveston — Opinion of the Court

The city is thus authorized itself to construct sidewalks, and, though the cost of construction is to be defrayed by the abutting lot-owners, the city is to collect from them the cost, and, in case of the sale of any lot made to enforce the collection, the city is to pay to the owner the surplus of any proceeds of sale remaining after payment of the amount due to it. It is not to be denied that this section confers upon the city council plenary authority to construct the sidewalks, and to do whatever is necessary for the construction, not prohibited by some other provision of law.
Source: Wikisource

William Strong Hitchcock v. Galveston — Opinion of the Court

It matters not that the promise was to pay in a manner not authorized by law. If payments cannot be made in bonds because their issue is ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment need not be made at all. Such is not the law. The contract between the parties is in force, so far as it is lawful.
There may be a difference between the case of an engagement made by a corporation to do an act expressly prohibited by its charter, or some other law, and a case of where legislative power to do the act has not been granted.
Source: Wikisource

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