Summary

by John Marshall Harlan Willcox Gibbs Sewing-Mach Company v…

One clause of the contract prohibits him from soliciting trade, directly or indirectly, in the territory 'of other agents;' another, that he will bind 'all subvendors or agents' to sustain the etablished retail prices of the company; and still another imposes restrictions upon the sale of his 'appointment or agency.' The agreement constituted him the sole agent of the company for the sale of its machines within a certain territory. It is true that the machines he undertook to sell were to be purchased by him from the company at a large discount.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Harlan Willcox Gibbs Sewing-Mach Company v…

He was still a mere agent to sell such machines as might be delivered to him under the contract. We perceive nothing in the agreement of 1874 to take the case out of the general rule that 'the principal has a right to determine or revoke the authority given to his agent at his own mere pleasure; for, since the authority is conferred by his mere will, and is to be executed for his own benefit and his own purposes, the agent cannot insist upon acting when the principal has withdrawn his confidence, and no longer desires his aid.' Story, Ag.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Harlan Willcox Gibbs Sewing-Mach Company v…

He contends that his life, or the continuance of the company in business, was the shortest duration of the contract, consistently with its provisions, provided he did his duty. This position is untenable. His appointment was made and accepted subject to the conditions expressed in the agreement. No one of those conditions is to the effect that so long as he devoted his time, attention, and abilities to the company's business he should retain his position as its exclusive vendor, within the territory named, without regard to its wishes.
Source: Wikisource

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