“ Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. ”
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1274). copy citation
| Author | Thomas Aquinas |
|---|---|
| Source | Summa Theologica |
| Topic | passion virtue |
| Date | 1274 |
| Language | English |
| Reference | |
| Note | Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province |
| Weblink | http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/17897/pg17897-images.html |
Context
“Dei xiv, 6) : "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.”
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