“ Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. ”
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1274). copy citation
| Author | Thomas Aquinas |
|---|---|
| Source | Summa Theologica |
| Topic | perseverance moderation |
| Date | 1274 |
| Language | English |
| Reference | |
| Note | Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province |
| Weblink | http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18755/pg18755-images.html |
Context
“Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7) , "perseverance is about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues.” source
Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues.” source
