David Newbern

“ We choose to adopt the rule that gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source not to be considered in assessing the damages due a personal-injury plaintiff. It is the rule recommended by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, and it is consistent with our oft-stated policy of allowing the innocent plaintiff, instead of the tortfeasor defendant, to receive any windfall associated with the cause of action. Accordingly, we hold that the Trial Court did not err by excluding evidence of the UAMS discount as a collateral source. ”

“ To establish the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct, (2) the conduct was extreme and out.rageous and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community, (3) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress, and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. ”

“ We have held that the collateral-source rule applies unless the evidence of the benefits from the collateral source is relevant for a purpose other than the mitigation of damages. Par.rish v. Newton, 298 Ark. 404, 768 S.W.2d 17 (1989) . The issue, then, is whether the forgiveness of a debt for medical services is a collateral source to be sheltered by the rule. There is no Arkansas authority dealing directly with that precise issue, but our cases explaining the policy behind the rule support the Trial Court's ruling. ”