Virginia Long

“ The fact that a physician has jury-rigged the knee to function with pins and wires in no way inhibits the characterization of that injury as the permanent loss of a bodily function. The same would be true of a plaintiff whose vision is restored with a lens, one whose hearing is restored with a hearing aid, and one whose heart is operating efficiently with a pacemaker or implanted valve. ”

“ The injury at the heart of false arrest is different in kind. It is the deprivation of liberty, an unspeakable personal and societal affront by the government against the people, that, standing alone, cannot be tolerated. ”

“ One is the limitation on the recovery of pain and suffering damages:
No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $ 1,000.00. ”

“ The time within which suit may be brought under this statute is entirely unrelated to the accrual of any cause of action.
Where a claim for redress is based upon negligent injury to person or property, the cause of action accrues when there has been a negligent act with proximately resulting injury or damage. The careless act itself is not enough to give rise to a cause of action; there must also be consequential injury or damage. ”

“ However, that every objective permanent injury results in substantial loss of a bodily function does not follow. An easy example is a completely healed fracture without any objective evidence of permanent substantial impairment. ”

“ One who is wrongfully deprived of freedom sustains an intangible injury, the magnitude of which cannot be measured or assessed in physical terms. Although this injury may, in some cases, also cause psychological or emotional trauma, a victim of false arrest/false imprisonment need not experience such trauma to have a legally compensable claim. ”

“ III Through its statute of repose, New Jersey provides protection from liability for architects and builders after a specific time period. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 provides in relevant part:
No action ... to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property ... shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction of such improvement to real property, more than 10 years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction. ”

“ V Greczyn's fundamental argument is that this case is a perfect paradigm for invocation of the fictitious-party practice rule in that she sustained an injury and filed suit-identifying Kling Lindquist, although not by name-within the ten year repose period. Kling Lindquist counters that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 prohibits any action against a “person” after ten years and that although Greczyn filed suit inside that window, it was not against a “person” within the meaning of the statute. ”

“ It is the proper function, indeed the obligation, of the judiciary to give effect to the obvious purpose of the Legislature, and to that end "words used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law. ”

“ Based on that standard, the Hammer court declared that in order to be considered a permanent disfigurement, a scar must impair or injure the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, deforming her in some manner. ”

“ Unlike statutes of limitation, statutes of repose may [p16] not be “tolled” for any reason, as “tolling” would deprive the defendant of the certainty of the repose deadline and thereby defeat the purpose of a statute of repose. See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, supra [425 Mass. 615] at 631 n. 19, 682 N.E.2d 624, citing Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 798, 569 N.E.2d 822 (1991) . The only way to satisfy the “absolute time limit” of a statute of repose is to “commence” the action prior to the expiration of that time limit. ”

“ In other words, though claiming against as yet “unnamable” persons, Greczyn's action was brought against “persons” nonetheless. Therefore, the plain language of the statute is not dispositive of the issue presented here.
VI We thus look beyond the words of the statute for enlightenment. As we have said, the legislative history, ordinarily a source of information, is not of assistance. Kling Lindquist suggests that our prior jurisprudence is dispositive of the correctness of the Appellate Division's holding that Greczyn's suit is barred. We disagree. ”

“ The theme of the Act is immunity for public entities with liability as the exception. Collins v. Union County Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 413, 696 A.2d 625 (1997) . Even where liability is present, the Act sets forth limitations on recovery. ”

“ Gilhooley's reconstructed knee can be considered to fall. Although not a perfect analogy to any class on the continuum, we think it is properly characterized as a perma-nent injury resulting in a substantial loss of bodily function. There is no question that Mrs. Gilhooley suffered a perma-nent injury. The fractured patella is plainly an objective impairment recognized by [p542] Brooks. ”

“ The legislative history of the act is singularly unhelpful. As we observed in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 194, 293 A.2d 662, 664 (1972) , it is “meager and unrevealing.” See also O'Connor v. ”