Virginia Long

“ V Greczyn's fundamental argument is that this case is a perfect paradigm for invocation of the fictitious-party practice rule in that she sustained an injury and filed suit-identifying Kling Lindquist, although not by name-within the ten year repose period. Kling Lindquist counters that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 prohibits any action against a “person” after ten years and that although Greczyn filed suit inside that window, it was not against a “person” within the meaning of the statute. ”

“ III Through its statute of repose, New Jersey provides protection from liability for architects and builders after a specific time period. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 provides in relevant part:
No action ... to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property ... shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction of such improvement to real property, more than 10 years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction. ”

“ Unlike statutes of limitation, statutes of repose may [p16] not be “tolled” for any reason, as “tolling” would deprive the defendant of the certainty of the repose deadline and thereby defeat the purpose of a statute of repose. See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, supra [425 Mass. 615] at 631 n. 19, 682 N.E.2d 624, citing Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 798, 569 N.E.2d 822 (1991) . The only way to satisfy the “absolute time limit” of a statute of repose is to “commence” the action prior to the expiration of that time limit. ”

“ We hold that, when plaintiff's injury and the filing of her lawsuit occur within the period of repose, utilization of our fictitious-party practice allows a previously unknown, although functionally identified, designer or builder to be named after the expiration of the period of repose, so long as plaintiff has acted diligently. ”

“ In other words, though claiming against as yet “unnamable” persons, Greczyn's action was brought against “persons” nonetheless. Therefore, the plain language of the statute is not dispositive of the issue presented here.
VI We thus look beyond the words of the statute for enlightenment. As we have said, the legislative history, ordinarily a source of information, is not of assistance. Kling Lindquist suggests that our prior jurisprudence is dispositive of the correctness of the Appellate Division's holding that Greczyn's suit is barred. We disagree. ”

“ The legislative history of the act is singularly unhelpful. As we observed in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 194, 293 A.2d 662, 664 (1972) , it is “meager and unrevealing.” See also O'Connor v. ”