William M. Fogarty

“ As the aircraft entered the 10 mile range from USS VINCENNES, the Captain was forced to make a decision. He had been told that: The aircraft is not responding to warnings; not acting like a commercial aircraft; the IFF mode and code were indicative of an Iranian military aircraft; and, most importantly, that the aircraft was decreasing in altitude, increasing in speed and on a closing flight profile with USS VINCENNES. As Captain Rogers says in his testimony, "... my confidence in confirmed to me that the aircraft was, in fact, a threat." ”

“ If we must operate in a low intensity conflict and in the presence of COMAIR, we must train to that environment, real or simulated. Request the CNO develop a fleet wide identification matrix for dense air traffic environments in third world/low intensity conflicts. Battle Group training doctrines, AAW procedures, numbered Fleet Commander Fighting Instructions, and workups should reflect consensus on ID matrices to deconflict COMAIR within war zones, when being used as "cover" for military aircraft, or when being used as suicide attackers. ”

“ On 2 July, USS HALSEY had to warn away a potentially threatening Iranian F-14.
(U) Upon arrival in the region every unit, including VINCENNES, was briefed on our past experience, the current ROE, and most recent intelligence. It is fair to say that incoming ships approach Gulf operations aware of the uncertain environment and with an appreciation of the reed for vigilance. Similarly, they have been impressed with their responsibility to defend themselves in a forehanded manner. Those thoughts are constantly on the minds of every commander and crew serving in the Gulf. ”

“ If a potentially hostile contact persists in closing after you warn him away and if, in your judgement, the threat of attack is imminent, it is an inherent right and responsibility to act in self-defense. We do not want, nor intend, to absorb a first attack. ”

“ The investigation also examined the training and watch organization of VINCENNES. Given the conditions existing on 3 July, Captain Rogers and his senior CIC watch personnel acted reasonably. That these officers relied on information from their combat team is not only reasonable--but is an absolute necessity in a pressure-packed environment. Watch teams train as a unit and function as a unit, not as separate individuals. It is impossible in the heat of battle to double check every piece of data being reported. The Commanding Officer and his senior watchstanders must rely on their subordinates. ”

“ Approved with the additional suggestion that the Chief of Naval Operations consider instituting a program for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) stress management to test and evaluate the impact of human stress on C3I operations in complex modern warships such as the AEGIS Cruiser. Integral to this program would be the incorporation of measures of human effectiveness into battle simulation techniques to assess the effect of peak overloads and stress on the human players. ”

“ The Iranians have Maverick missiles. Each missile can be launched from ranges of .5 to 13 NM and television guided. The launching aircraft must be able to keep visual track of the target but does not have to illuminate the target with radar.
⁠ (5) Although there has been no record of F-14s being used for iron bomb attacks, the aircraft is capable of being modified to be used in that role. To use iron bombs, the F-14 would have to close to within 2 NM of the target. ”

“ Additionally, the Commanding Officer's attention which Was devoted to the ongoing surface engagement against IRGC forces (the "wolf closest to the sled") , left very little time for him to personally verify information provided to him by his CIC team--a team in which he had great confidence. The fog of war and those human elements which affect each individual differently--not the least of which was the thought of the Stark incident--are factors that must be considered. ”

“ It is an awesome weapon. The most capable platform in the U.S. inventory for handling this threat is the AEGIS cruiser. It makes the greatest sense to me to utilize the best available platform against the gravest threat. Accordingly, I strongly endorse the deployment of an AEGIS cruiser to the region as long as the Iranian Silkworm missile is considered a likely threat. (U) I recommend the Secretary of Defense refer this investigation to the Chief of Naval Operations for follow-on actions consistent with the Investigating Officer's recommendations as modified. ”

“ To prevent the possibility that commercial aircraft could become innocent victims in this area of armed conflict, the USG should seek ICAO's immediate attention to revise the existing commercial air route structure over the waters of the Persian Gulf. ”

“ The ROE prohibits intrusion into Iranian territorial waters or airspace except in the following circumstances: If a unit has been attacked by a hostile vessel or aircraft, pursuit may be conducted into the offending belligerent’s territorial waters or airspace if the hostile force continues to pose an imminent threat after entry into such waters or airspace. ”

“ In response to the U.S. operation, Iranian aircraft and warships deployed from Bandar Abbas to join Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) small boats from Abu Musa Island and Qeshm Island in attacks on U.S. owned or associated oil rigs, platforms and jack-up rigs. During the engagement with U.S. forces, two Iranian frigates and one missile patrol boat were sunk or severely damaged. F-4s scrambled during the day from Bandar Abbas. USS WAINWRIGHT launched missiles at one of the aircaft, damaging it when the aircraft failed to respond to repeated warnings and continued to close the ship. ”

“ The warnings issued by USS VINCENNES over IAD and MAD nets were transmitted and were heard by other units. However, it is impossible to know whether a particular aircraft has heard a challenge unless it replies or turns away.
F.⁠COMMERCIAL AIR
⁠1.⁠ (U) Commercial air, particularly commercial air from Iran, is at risk in the Persian Gulf as long as hostilities continue in the area. Unless an aircraft can be visually identified as a non-threat, any aircraft approaching a U.S. Navy ship could be considered a threat. ”

“ USS VINCENNES was advised by CJTFME on 18 June 1988 of the changing patterns of F-4s operating from Bandar Abbas: "All units are cautioned to be on the alert for more aggressive behavior. Reports of Iranian plans to reconvert some F-4s for air to ground roles using iron bombs, Mavericks, Iranian produced 440 lb bombs, or unguided 'Eagle' missiles would all point toward an offensive, vice defensive capability." ”

“ Although Iraq used its superior Air Force to target Iranian oil installations around the head of the Gulf and Kharg Island early in the war, the purchase of EXOCET missiles from France in 1983 provided Iraq with a credible ship attack capability. ”

“ These practices, despite some grumbling, have been generally accepted in the Gulf. Unfortunately, few commercial airlines saw fit to reroute their aircraft or to make any other significant allowances for the hostile environment. Still, it is clear that all concerned were aware that U.S. ships were deployed in the area and that those units fully intended to defend themselves when necessary.
( ) For several months preceding the Air Bus shootdown, the U.S. had received reports of Iranian efforts to improve their ability to attack U.S. men-of-war. ”

“ The limited number of VHF radios on U.S. surface units degrades their ability to simultaneously monitor the IAD frequency and communicate with civilian air traffic control agencies.
⁠7. Bandar Abbas Tower, Approach Control and Tehran Center did not hear, or failed to relay, the IAD warnings issued by USS VINCENNES to IR 655.
⁠8. The current tools used by the U.S. Navy for differentiating between friendly and hostile unknown aircraft were designed primarily for the open ocean environment. U.S. Naval weapon systems can reach further and often react more quickly than sensors can evaluate. ”

“ The primary source for the reports that the aircraft of interest was rapidly decreasing in altitude, at 1,000 feet per mile, and increasing speed on a course directly toward USS VINCENNES was the TIC, . He apparently interjected these reports on the ship's Command Communication Circuit 15 every time he had the opportunity "to make sure they were staying informed and... [not] getting too sidetracked by the surface engagement where they were forgetting about the guy coming in." ”

“ During a four day period (9-12 May) , USS VINCENNES conducted the following Middle East Force training in the Subic Bay operating areas: two missile firings (both successful) , one war-at-sea strike exercise, CIWS tracking/firing, Silkworm profiles, air intercept controlling, anti-fast patrol boat exercises (night and day) , surface gunnery, and surface to air gunnery.
⁠ (10) The WASEX conducted on 9 May 1988 included attacking aircraft. A post exercise critique was conducted on 10 May with USAF, USMC, and USS VINCENNES personnel present. ”

“ In the three day period prior to the incident, there was heightened air and naval activity in the Persian Gulf. Iraq conducted air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and shipping 30 June through 2 July 1988. Iranian response was to step up ship attacks. Additionally, Iran deployed two, possibly three, F-14's from Bushehr to Bandar Abbas. U.S. Forces in the Persian Gulf were alerted to the probability of significant Iranian military activity resulting from Iranian retaliation for recent Iraqi military successes. ”

“ The Iranian Air Force and Iranian warships have conducted a total of 187 attacks on shipping since the campaign began in March 1984, most of those attacks occurred prior to August 1986. Fighter aircraft conducted a majority of these attacks using iron bombs and Maverick missiles. In comparison to the attacks conducted by the IRGC small boats, the air attacks were among the most damaging. (IO Exhibit 14, Intelligence Background Briefing) . ”

“ The Findings of Fact are arranged with background on the intelligence and operational picture in the Persian Gulf to provide the reviewer with essentially the same data which was available to CJTFME and the USS VINCENNES on 3 July 1988. Environmental factors, commercial air information, data on Iran Air Flight 655, and relevant portions of the Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE) are then treated as discrete blocks of information before addressing the USS VINCENNES training and readiness, watch organization, overall combat system status, communications, and combat systems doctrine. ”

“ In the excitement of the impending engagement, it is entirely possible that reports of decreasing altitude passed over the net by TIC after the 15 NM point could have occurred if TIC passed only range values, which were interpreted as altitude, or he simply mis-read his CRO and interchanged altitude and range.
⁠12.⁠ (U) The ship's air controller supervisor's recollection of 7800 ft altitude at 6 NM was actually the altitude of TN 4131 33 seconds after missile intercept. In other words, the plane's altitude as it was plummeting to the water. ”

“ It should be appreciated that AEGIS was never advertised as being capable of identifying the type of aircraft being tracked. That decision is still a matter for human judgment; despite AEGIS' considerable capabilities. AEGIS' major advantages are the extended range of its sensors, its fast reaction time, the capacity to track many targets at once, its ability to send this information automatically to other units, and its data displays which combine sensor information with other inputs and better convey it to the users. ”

“ During the afternoon and evening hours of 2 July 1988 and continuing into the morning of 3 July 1988, Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) armed small boats (Boghammers, and Boston Whalers) positioned themselves at the western approach to the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) . From this position, they were challenging merchant vessels, which has been a precursor to merchant ship attacks. ”

“ For example, live missile exercises could include a percentage of the inbound drones be flown on COMAIR profiles, with proper modes and codes, in close proximity of simulated hostile targets. Another method would be to have aggressor aircraft act as COMAIR to challenge the deconfliction capabilities of surface ships with/without VID capability. ”

“ Commerical air flights that do not approach Iran during any part of the flight or come from non-belligerent air space and are at the high altitudes normally flown by air carriers are relatively easy to identify. (Enclosure (21) ) .
⁠ (5) (U) The width of the airway assigned to Iranian Air Flt 655 (A-59) was: 20NM (10NM either side of centerline) from Bandar Abbas to reporting position DARAX and 10NM (5NM either side of center line to Sharjah. Airway A-59 runs from an altitude of 4500 feet to infinity. The total length of the air route is 123NM. (IO Exhibit 249) . ”

“ At approximately 0647Z — Iran Air Flight 655 was detected by the USS VINCENNES's AN/SPY-1A radar bearing 025 degrees, 47NM, at 900 feet and seconds later was assigned TN 4131. At approximately 0648Z, USS SIDES detected Iran Air Flight 655, bearing approximately 355 degrees, range approximately 32 miles at 1500 feet altitude. The aircraft continued to close USS VINCENNES with a constant bearing, decreasing range. ”

“ The data extracted depicted the Iran Air Flight 655 flight profile from first detection to missile intercept. Further, the data allowed reconstruction of all "button actions" by Command and Decision (C&D) console operators in CIC and the information available to them on their console read-outs. Crucial to the investigation became close examination of the approximately 3 minute 45 second period just prior to the Commanding Officer’s final decision to fire. During this period, verbal reports were being made by one of the console operators over internal circuits of decreasing range and altitude. ”