“ CIA memo,Walter to Acting DCI, "Africa Division's Recommendations Regarding Sudan," Dec. 17, 1996.The CIA official who ran the Sudanese portfolio and met with the Sudanese on numerous occasions told us the Sudanese were not going to deliver, and the perceived moderates "were just flat-out lying." Mark interview (May 12, 2004) .
In February 1997, the Sudanese sent letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, extending an invitation for a U.S. counterterrorism inspection mission to visit Sudan.The Sudanese also used private U.S. citizens to pass along offers to cooperate. ”

“ But Taliban "charter flights" continued to fly between Afghanistan and the UAE. Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, "Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda Funds Flowed," Los AngelesTimes, Jan. 20, 2002, p. A1. Enforcing the financial restrictions also proved a challenge-especially in the Middle East. Anthony Wayne interview (Jan. 14, 2004) ; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004) ; DOS report,"Usama Bin Ladin Intelligence Update," Nov. 19, 1999.
89. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Oct. 30, 1999.
90. Ibid.; NSC memo, Benjamin to CSG, Nov. ”

“ DOS cable, Abu Dhabi 04644, "Taliban Refuse to Expel Bin Ladin Despite UAEG Ultimatum: Need to Stiffen UAE Resolve to Take the Necessary Next Steps," July 19, 1999.
167. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright,"UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin Laden," July 16, 1999.
168. Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003) . Schroen, however, told us that the tribals' reporting was 50-60 percent accurate. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004) .
169. For discussion of the Taliban generally, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000) . ”

“ Of the 200 people at the Center, the new Bin Ladin unit had about 12. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003) . Staffing of the UBL unit had risen to 40-50 employees by Sept. 11, 2001, out of about 390 CTC employees. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003) ; CIA response to Commission questions for the record, Jan. 21, 2004.
3. On Fadl, see, e.g., Intelligence reports on historical background of Bin Ladin's army (Nov. 26, 1996;Apr. 18, 1997) ; on the structure of al Qaeda and leadership composition (Dec. 18, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996) ”

“ DOS cable, Islamabad 007665,"High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances," Oct. 12, 1998.
65. NSC memo, Sept. 24, 1998; Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 414.
66.The CIA in particular pressed the Saudis hard on intelligence sharing. DCI Tenet met with Crown Prince Abdullah,Ambassador Bandar, the minister of defense and aviation, and other senior officials repeatedly and pressed them on counterterrorism. See, e.g., CIA memo,Tenet to Berger,Tenet's meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah in Jeddah, June 7, 1998. ”

“ Feb. 27, 2000; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004) .The U.S. government team learned that the Bin Ladin family sold UBL's share of the inheritance and, at the direction of the Saudi government, placed the money into a specified account then frozen by the Saudi government in 1994.
71. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. According to Clarke,Tenet's deputy, John Gordon, agreed that there was no senior CIA manager to answer these questions and promised to fix that.
72. DOS memo, McKune to Albright,"State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Pakistan," Feb. 1998. ”

“ See Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," Washington Times, Aug. 21, 1998, p. 1. Regarding the leak, see Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003) ; Richard Taylor interview (Dec. 10, 2003) ; Don Kerr interview (Sept. 9, 2003) .
106. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998; NSC talking points, Nov. 3, 1998. The quoted sentence is in boldface.
107. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG Meeting, Oct. 28, 1998; NSC notes, CSG Agenda:"Bin Ladin Penetration of the United States," Oct. ”