Anthony Kennedy

“ Nothing in the foregoing discussion suggests that the fee-shifting and sanctioning provisions in the Federal Rules and Title 28 eliminate the inherent power to impose sanctions for certain conduct. Limitations on a power do not constitute its abrogation. Cases can arise in which a federal court must act to preserve its authority in a manner not provided for by the Federal Rules or Title 28. But as the number and scope of rules and statutes governing litigation misconduct increase, the necessity to resort to inherent authority-a predicate to its proper application-lessens. ”

“ This explanation of the permitted sphere of inherent powers to shift fees as a sanction for bad faith litigation conduct is as illegitimate as it is unprecedented. The American Rule recognizes that the legislature, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional responsibility for defining sanctions and fees; the bad faith exception to the Rule allows courts to assess fees not provided for by Congress "in narrowly defined circumstances." ”

“ It bars a federal court from shifting fees as a matter of substantive policy, but its bad faith exception permits fee shifting as a sanction to the extent necessary to protect the judicial process. The Rule protects each person's right to go to federal court to define and to vindicate substantive rights. " [S] ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit." ”

“ Inherent powers can be exercised only when necessary, and there is no necessity if a rule or statute provides a basis for sanctions. It follows that a district court should rely on text-based authority derived from Congress rather than inherent power in every case where the text-based authority applies. ”

“ This confusion in the premises of the District Court's order highlights the mischief caused by reliance on undefined inherent powers rather than on Rules and statutes that proscribe particular behavior. The ambiguity of the scope of the sanctionable conduct cannot be resolved against petitioner alone, who, despite the conceded bad-faith conduct of his attorneys, has been slapped with all of respondent's not inconsiderable attorney's fees. ”

“ The trial court also explained that " [t] he attorney's fees and expenses charged to NASCO by its attorneys . . . flowed from and were a direct result of this suit. We shall include them in the attorney's fees sanctions." Id., at 142 (emphasis added) .
Despite the Court's equivocation on the subject, ante, at 54, n. 16, it is impermissible to allow a District Court acting pursuant to its inherent authority to sanction such prelitigation primary conduct. A Court's inherent authority extends only to remedy abuses of the judicial process. ”

“ Link reasoned that " [n] either the permissive language of the Rule . . . nor its policy" meant that the rule "abrogate [d] " the inherent power of federal courts to dismiss sua sponte. The permissive language at issue in Link distinguishes it from the present context, because some sanctioning provisions, such as Rule 11 and Rule 26 (g) , are cast in mandatory terms. ”

“ It requires a district court to impose reasonable sanctions, including attorneys fees, when a party or attorney violates the certification standards that attach to the signing of certain legal papers. ”

“ By direct action and delegation, Congress has exercised this constitutional prerogative to provide district courts with a comprehensive arsenal of Federal Rules and statutes to protect themselves from abuse. A district court can punish contempt of its authority, including disobedience of its process, by fine or imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 401; award costs, expenses, and attorney's fees against attorneys who multiply proceedings vexatiously, 28 U.S.C. § 1927; sanction a party and/or the party's attorney for filing groundless pleadings, motions, or other papers, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 11 ”