Armistead Lindsay Long

“ But should we draw him far away from the defenses of his capital, and defeat him on a field of our own choosing, his army would be irretrievably lost, and the victory would be attended with results of the utmost importance." Gettysburg and York were designated as points suitable for such a battle. With such prospects in the range of possibility, any commander might be willing to risk for a time his communications, especially when the theatre of operations abounds in supplies, and the invading army is accompanied by a powerful cavalry. ”

“ A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof of this is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on too large a scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground and where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac. ”

“ I think enough has been said to explain the causes of the failure of the Confederates on the second at Gettysburg.
From the nature of the country, the absence of cavalry and the proximity of an uncrippled enemy, the flank movement referred to was simply an absurdity. The attack of Pickett's division on the third has been more criticized, and is still less understood, than any other act of the Gettysburg drama. General Longstreet did not enter into the spirit of it, and consequently did not support it with his wonted vigor. ”