Summary

Horace Gray Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Company…

Congress has not legislated concerning any civil rights upon guano islands, but has left such rights to be governed by whatever laws may apply to citizens of the United States in countries having no civilized government of their own. The whole right conferred upon the discoverer and his assigns is a license to occupy the island for the purpose of removing the guano.
Source: Wikisource

Horace Gray Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Company…

The petitioner claims, and can claim, no rights under that act, both because her husband had died before its passage, and because the assignment of his right to Cooper had been recognized by the United States in the proclamation of the president, above mentioned. It is argued for the petitioner that the act of 1872 is 'in the nature of a statutory recognition of the widow's derivative right, and the widow's only right at common law is dower.' But the statute does not purport to secure the right of the discoverer to his widow and heirs only.
Source: Wikisource

Horace Gray Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Company…

This right cannot last after the guano is removed, and, by the express terms of the act, it may be terminated at any time 'at the pleasure of congress.' The act, as well observed by Mr. Dana in his notes to Wheaton, 'secures to citizens the usufruct of unoccupied guano deposits which they have discovered and peacefully occupied, beyond the jurisdiction of any foreign state, upon certain terms as to the sale and exportation of the guano, and stipulates for nothing beyond the usufruct while the guano remains.' Wheat. Int. Law, (8th Ed.)
Source: Wikisource

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