John Marshall Harlan II

“ If, however, the opinion of the Court is intended to suggest that the central, or even a principal, issue in deciding the propriety of abstention is whether the complaint has alleged 'overbreadth,' or only 'vagueness,' with respect to the New York statute in question, I cannot agree. My reasons are three. First, neither principle has ever been definitively delimited by this Court; a doctrine built upon their supposed differences would be likely to founder for lack of a foundation. See generally, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. ”

“ City of Thibodaux, supra, 360 U.S., at 33, 79 S.Ct., at 1075, or it might reasonably conclude that a state court determination would present the federal issues 'in a different posture.' County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., supra, 360 U.S., at 189, 79 S.Ct., at 1063. Third, such a standard might in effect reduce the abstention doctrine to a pleader's option; the fundamental interests served by the doctrine would be jettisoned whenever a complainant had sufficient foresight to insert into his pleading an allegation of overbreadth. ”

“ See, e.g., Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 62 S.Ct. 986, 86 L.Ed. 1355; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. ”