Samuel Alito

“ For centuries, trial judges have enjoyed authority to comment on the evidence. At common law, the judge was empowered to "weig [h] the evidence" and share an "opinion" with the jury, even "in matter of fact." 2 M. Hale, History of the Common Law of England 147 (5th ed. 1794) (hereinafter Hale) . [*] The practice is well established in this Court's cases as well. The Court has recognized that a trial judge has "discretion" to "comment upon the evidence," to call the jury's "attention to parts of it which he thinks important," and to "express his opinion upon the facts." ”

“ Smith argued on appeal that the judge's comments coerced the jury's verdict. A California intermediate appellate court rejected that claim. The California Supreme Court denied review. Smith then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §2254, which the District Court granted. A split Ninth Circuit panel affirmed.
II Smith's claim on federal habeas is that the California appellate court unreasonably applied this Court's clearly established law forbidding coercive jury instructions. §2254 (d) (1) ; see Brief in Opposition 12. ”

“ Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) . An "unreasonable application" of that law involves not just an erroneous or incorrect decision, but an objectively unreasonable one. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ (2010) . ”