Thurgood Marshall, Shell v. Mississippi — Opinion of the Court
“ Obviously, a limiting instruction can be used to give content to a statutory factor that "is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer" only if the limiting instruction's own "definitions are constitutionally sufficient," that is, only if the limiting instruction itself "provide [s] some guidance to the sentencer." ”
Thurgood Marshall, Shell v. Mississippi — Opinion of the Court
“ It reasoned that Maynard was distinguishable because the trial court in this case limited the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor in its charge to the jury. The instruction in question provided:" [T] he word heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of [,] the suffering of others." ”
