United States District Court, District of Columbia.

“ E. The Government Has Not Subjected Wolfe to Improper Multiple Prosecution and Punishment.
[8] [9] Wolfe contends that he has been the victim of multiple prosecution and punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. According to the defendant, the charges in the present indictment arise from the same series of acts or transactions as those charged in the earlier case against Wolfe, and therefore the current indictment is improper. ”

“ In order to meet the evidentiary threshold to merely obtain an entrapment instruction in the District of Columbia, there must be a foundation in the evidence in the light viewed most favorably to the accused, for a finding of inducement by a government agent, that is persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship, and any other government conduct which would create the risk of causing an otherwise unpredisposed person to commit the crime charged. ”

“ Each of these charges concerns offenses which did not occur in the courthouse, did not occur in the months of May or June of 1976, and are completely distinct from the offenses encompassed in the agreement entered into between the government and the defendant. The defendant's contention that there was a mutual understanding that he would be immune from further prosecution for all such offenses is not supported by the record. Before Judge Flannery the defendant indicated that the only promises made to induce his plea were immunity for the three courthouse incidents in May or June of 1976. ”

“ Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) , the Supreme Court pointed out that the established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment is whether each crime requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Id. ”

“ Id. Furthermore, the Court held that even if there were a valid legislative purpose, the questions were not material to the subcommittee's investigation. Id. at 389. According to the Court in Icardi, at the time the defendant was questioned, which was after the committee admittedly had all the information that was necessary to fulfill its function, the alleged perjurious answers were not material to the subcommittee's authorized investigation. Id. ”