Summary

William Caldwell The Philosophical Review — Review of Der menschliche Weltbegriff (1892)

He found that the world-conception which satisfied the world-problem must be a conception whose content is pure experience. But scientific study may lead to the belief that all we know is what is within our consciousness; i.e. may lead back to the point of departure of Idealism. How is it then that one seems to take to Realism to get away from Idealism, and then to be led by Realism to the same dualism of what is within and what is without consciousness which the Idealist tries to explain away?
Source: Wikisource

William Caldwell The Philosophical Review — Review of Der menschliche Weltbegriff (1892)

A person who is convinced of the utter unfruitfulness of philosophical idealism [Idealism, our author suggests, comports itself only too well alongside of practical realism, and under circumstances of even Materialism] may simply neglect the initial position of an idealistic epistemology about immediate subjective consciousness (not such a baneful position in Psychology as in Epistemology) , and resolve to study experience without a presupposition of any kind.
Source: Wikisource

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