William J. Brennan, Jr.

“ We must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law.' [4]
We read Dagnello, however, as requiring the Court of Appeals in applying this standard to make a detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages. Indeed this re-examination led to the conclusion in Dagnello that it was not a denial of justice to permit the jury's award to stand. ”

“ If the Court of Appeals made a similar appraisal of the evidence in this case, the details are not disclosed in the majority opinion. Beyond attaching unexplained significance to petitioner's failure in his complaint 'to ask for damages in such a large sum as $305,000,' the relevant discussion is limited to the bald statement that 'giving Grunenthal the benefit of every doubt, and weighing the evidence precisely in the same manner as we did in Dagnello * * * we cannot in any rational manner consistent with the evidence arrive at a sum in excess of $200,000.' 388 F.2d, at 484. ”

“ Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586-587 (C.A.7th Cir. 1952) ; Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (C.A.8th Cir. 1962) ; Covery Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561 (C.A.9th Cir. 1951) ; Barnes v. ”