Summary

William J. Brennan, Jr. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation…

This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a typical third-party beneficiary contract. The promisor's interest in the third party here goes far beyond the mere performance of its promise to that third party, i.e., beyond the payment of royalty. It is a commonplace of modern industrial relations for employers to provide security for employees and their families to enable them to meet problems arising from unemployment, illness, old age or death.
Source: Wikisource

William J. Brennan, Jr. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation…

Not only has Benedict entered into a longterm relationship with the union in this regard, but in compliance with § 302 (c) (5) (B) it has assumed equal responsibility with the union for the management of the fund. In a very real sense Benedict's interest in the soundness of the fund and its management is in no way less than that of the promisee union. This of itself cautions against reliance upon language which does not explicitly provide that the parties contracted to protect Benedict by allowing the company to set off its damages against its royalty obligation.
Source: Wikisource

William J. Brennan, Jr. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation…

Furthermore, Benedict promised in the collective bargaining agreement to pay a specified scale of wages to the employees. It would not be contended that Benedict might recoup its damages by decreasing these wages. This could be rationalized by saying that the covenant to pay wages is included in separate contracts of hire entered into with each employee. The royalty payments are really another form of compensation to the employees, [10] and as such the obligation to pay royalty might be thought to be incorporated into the individual employment contracts.
Source: Wikisource

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