William O. Douglas

“ Nor did the application of § 11 turn on whether the judgment rendered prior to the death or resignation of the official was for or against the plaintiff. The inability of one who no longer holds the office to perform any of the official duties would indeed only be emphasized by the rendition of the coercive judgment.
It is argued that § 11 should be read as covering only those 'actions brought against officials for remedies which could not be got in a direct suit against the United States.' Such a reading requires more than a tailoring of the Act; it requires a full alteration. ”

“ But that Act preserved those judgments against abatement by reason of the death or retirement of the Federal Agent and allowed substitution at any time before satisfaction of the judgment. Therefore, on remand of the cause in the Davis case the successor Federal Agent could be substituted and the judgment enforced against him. On remand of the present cause there would be no way of substituting the successor, as the suit had abated in the District Court. Vacating the judgment of the District Court was therefore the proper procedure. ”

“ Neither party made any effort within the six months period [2] to have Buck's successor in office substituted for him. The Court of Appeals therefore ruled that the action had abated; it then vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. 85 U.S.App.D.C. 428, 179 F.2d 466.
The complaint in this case makes no claim against Buck personally. Therefore we put to one side cases such as Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 22 S.Ct. 493, 46 L.Ed. 713, dealing with actions in assumpsit against collectors for taxes erroneously collected. ”