by John Marshall Harlan

“ The state of Tennessee, in 1846, created a corporation by the name of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company. The legislature of Alabama subsequently passed an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company.' That act referred to the act of the Tennessee legislature, and granted to said company a right of way through Alabama, to construct its road between certain points named, declaring that it should have all the rights and privileges granted to it by the said act of incorporation, subject to the restrictions therein imposed. ”

“ To make such a company a corporation of another state, the language used must imply creation, or adoption in such form as to confer the power usually exercised over corporations by the state, or by the legislature, and such allegiance as a state corporation owes to its creator. ”

“ It was there said: 'It does not seem to admit of question that a corporation of one state, owning property and doing business in another state, by permission of the latter, does not thereby become a citizen of this state also. ”

“ The jury having been properly directed, in view of all the evidence, to find a verdict for the company, it is unnecessary to consider the exceptions taken to its refusal to grant certain instructions asked in behalf of the plaintiff. ”

“ And the same observation applies to the proviso in the seventh section of the act of December 4, 1851, which requires that Kentucky should grant to Tennessee, or to such companies as the latter state might 'charter,' the right of way from Nashville to intersect with a named road at certain points in Kentucky, with the like powers and privileges granted by Kentucky to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. ”

“ Without considering the question whether those sections are intended for the benefit of the general public only, not for the servants of the company,-especially one whose negligence caused or contributed to cause the accident,-it i sufficient to say that the court below correctly held that the requirements of the Tennessee Code were complied with by the company; so far, at least, as the circumstances attending the jnjury of the deceased are concerned. A verdict based upon a different view of the evidence should have been set aside, upon motion by the defendant. ”

“ While the title of a statute should not be entirely ignored in determining the legislative intent, it cannot be used 'to extend or restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act,' and is of little weg ht even when the meaning of such provisions is doubtful. ”