Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason.
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1274). copy citation

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Author Thomas Aquinas
Source Summa Theologica
Topic evil difference
Date 1274
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/17611/pg17611-images.html

Context

“Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.
Reply Obj. 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality.” source