W.H. "Dub" Arnold

Biographical details

W.H. "Dub" Arnold Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Association… (2001)

Relying on these cases, Carpenter, Bishop, and most heavily upon Meadows, the majority of this court concluded in Chatelain that a decision to include fetus in the definition of person would "create an inconsistency in the laws of this State by holding 'person' included viable fetus for the purpose of the wrongful death statute when we have reached the contrary conclusion in the criminal law and the law of probate."
Source: Wikisource

W.H. "Dub" Arnold Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Association… (2001)

The Meadows decision was predicated upon the lack of legislative guidance in defining the term "person." As a result, this court was obliged to turn to the common-law definition of person, which did not include a viable fetus. Meadows, 291 Ark. at 107–108, 722 S.W.2d at 585. Act 1273 of 1999 is consistent with Amendment 68 to the Arkansas Constitution, and if there had been any doubt concerning the State's public policy on this subject, it is now laid to rest. We are no longer constrained by the common-law definition of person.
Source: Wikisource

W.H. "Dub" Arnold Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Association… (2001)

Erma Washington and Erma Washington, M.D., and Associates, P.A., based upon her part-time state employment. In reviewing a summary-judgment case, we need only decide if the trial court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented by the moving parties, Dr. Washington and her employer, left a material question of fact unanswered. Notably, the moving party always bears the burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment. All proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the resisting party, and any doubts must be resolved against the moving party.
Source: Wikisource

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