Summary

Alfred Thayer Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History… (1890)

There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles--that the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign, that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved De Grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.
Source: Wikisource

Alfred Thayer Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History… (1890)

The thirteen leading French ships, obeying the last signal they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with De Grasse would have done the same had they not been headed off by Hood's division. The result of Rodney's own action alone, therefore, would have been to divide the French fleet into two parts, separated by a space of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. The English, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to "contain" the eleven lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather ones in overwhelming force.
Source: Wikisource

Alfred Thayer Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History… (1890)

The abandonment of the attack upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet, shows conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat the force which threatens them. There remains at least one criticism, delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in general.
Source: Wikisource

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