Antonin Scalia

“ Why could the Supreme Court of Alabama not consider lawful (but disreputable) conduct, both inside and outside Alabama, for the purpose of assessing just how bad an actor BMW was?
The Court follows up its statement that “Alabama does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred” with the statement: “Nor may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.” ”

“ Our punitive-damages jurisprudence compels such a response. The Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our Nation's legal culture (no matter how much in need of correction it may be) , and the application of the Court's new rule of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the “reasonableness” of the award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed. ”

“ The only support for the Court's position is to be found in a handful of errant federal cases, bunched within a few years of one other, which invented the notion that an unfairly severe civil sanction amounts to a violation of constitutional liberties. ”

“ Of course it will not be easy for the States to comply with this new federal law of damages, no matter how willing they are to do so. In truth, the “guideposts” mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all. As to “degree of reprehensibility” of the defendant's conduct, we learn that “‘nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence,'” ante, at 15 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-293 (1983) ) , and that “‘trickery and deceit'” are “more reprehensible than negligence,” ante, at 15. ”