Byron White

“ Appellants are, at least in part, indirect purchasers of cement, and so under Illinois Brick, like the State of Illinois in that case, would not be entitled to recover on their indirect purchaser claims under § 4 unless those claims fell within one of the exceptions. In their complaints, however, appellants also alleged violations of their respective state antitrust laws under which, as a matter of state law, indirect purchasers arguably are allowed to recover for all overcharges passed on to them by direct purchasers. ”

“ Illinois Brick was concerned that requiring direct and indirect purchasers to apportion the recovery under a single statute-§ 4 of the Clayton Act-would result in no one plaintiff having a sufficient incentive to sue under that statute. State indirect purchaser statutes pose no similar risk to the enforcement of the federal law. ”

“ Given the long history of state common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices, [4] it is plain that this is an area traditionally regulated by the States. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, supra, 373 U.S., at 146, 83 S.Ct., at 1219 (regulation to "prevent the deception of consumers") . ”

“ Illinois, 431 U.S., at 732, n. 12, 97 S.Ct., at 2067, n. 12, and when the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by the indirect purchaser, id., at 736, n. 16, 97 S.Ct., at 2070, n. 16.↑ The statutes of Alabama, California, and Minnesota expressly allow indirect purchasers to sue. See Ala.Code § 6-5-60 (a) (1975) (allowing recovery by any person "injured or damaged . . ., direct or indirect") ; Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Ann. § 16750 (a) (West Supp.1989) (allowing recovery "regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant") ”