Byron White

“ We are wholly unpersuaded. There is before us little more than a complaint with its exhibits. The agency shop clause of the contract is, at best, ambiguous on its face and it should not, in the present posture of the case, be construed against respondent to raise a substantial difference between this and the General Motors case. There is no ironclad restriction imposed upon the use of nonmember fees, for the clause merely describes the payments as being for 'the purpose of aiding the Union' in meeting collective bargaining expenses. ”

“ The union's budget is balanced. By paying a larger share of collective bargaining costs the nonmember subsidizes the union's institutional activities. In overall effect, economically, and we think for the purposes of § 14 (b) , the contract here is the same as the General Motors agency shop arrangement. Petitioners' argument, if accepted, would lead to the anomalous result of permitting Florida to invalidate the agency shop but forbidding it to ban the present service fee arrangement under which collective bargaining services cost the nonmember more than the member. ”

“ It follows that the General Motors case rules this one, for we there held that the 'agency shop' arrangement involved here-which imposes on employees the only membership obligation enforceable under § 8 (a) (3) by discharge, namely, the obligation to pay initiation fees and regular dues-is the 'practical equivalent' of an 'agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.' Whatever may be the status of less stringent union-security arrangements, the agency shop is within § 14 (b) . ”