Summary

Dolores Sloviter Brock v. Richardson — Opinion of the Court

The parties have directed us to no case, nor have we found one, considering whether an employer's belief that an employee has engaged in protected activity is sufficient to trigger application of section 15 (a) (3) . Nonetheless, we reject Richardson's argument that the section is inapplicable if the employer's perception turns out to be mistaken. The Fair Labor Standards Act is part of the large body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during the Great Depression, and has been liberally interpreted.
Source: Wikisource

Dolores Sloviter Brock v. Richardson — Opinion of the Court

Richardson argues that in order to prove a violation of section 15 (a) (3) , the government must show both that the discharged employee engaged in one of the specified overt acts and that the employer was aware of the act. He contends that because Banyas did not in fact file a complaint, and because the court did not find that Banyas engaged in one of the acts specifically protected under the statute, [2] there can be no violation of the statute. According to Richardson, the employer's mere belief that the employee has engaged in protected conduct is not enough.
Source: Wikisource

Dolores Sloviter Brock v. Richardson — Opinion of the Court

In each of these instances, the employee's activities were considered necessary to the effective assertion of employees' rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and thus entitled to protection. [3]
It is also of some relevance that section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) , which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in order to discourage membership in any labor organization, has been held to apply to protect employees even if they did not in fact engage in protected activity.
Source: Wikisource

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