Summary

Jenna Munnelly Thaler v. Perlmutter, Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (2023)

In Naruto, the court’s analysis of the monkey’s standing to bring a copyright claim was based on its status as a non-human. In determining that only a human has standing under the Act, the court examined statutory provisions involving the term “author” and concluded that they “all imply humanity.” Naruto, 888 F.3d at 426. Indeed, if the term “author” implies humanity in a standing context, it must also imply humanity when used in the context of copyrightability. Plaintiff recognizes as much – acknowledging that identical terms within the same statute bear the same meaning.
Source: Wikisource

Jenna Munnelly Thaler v. Perlmutter, Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (2023)

Like the remainder of the Act, the works made for hire provision undermines Plaintiff’s claim that the Court can disregard the human authorship requirement. Plaintiff does not – and cannot – explain why the corporate acquisition of rights in a copyrighted work is equivalent to non-human creation of such a work. And, Plaintiff seems to acknowledge that the normal rule, in all other contexts, is that the creator of a work is considered its author.
Source: Wikisource

Jenna Munnelly Thaler v. Perlmutter, Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (2023)

Clarifying ownership in real property is important not just to avoid disputes, but also to establish who is responsible for caring for the property. By contrast, unowned expressive works reside in the public domain. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) . ↑ The Copyright Office’s human authorship requirement also satisfies the somewhat stricter Chevron standard, which obliges a court, ordinarily, to leave undisturbed a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute if Congress has not directly addressed the issue presented.
Source: Wikisource

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