John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh

“ Besides having major shortages in both personnel and equipment, the active infantry units were also inadequately trained. At first the disintegration caused by rapid demobilization had made effective unit training virtually impossible, and the numerous administrative chores of occupation duty also interfered with training programs. Occupation of the countries defeated in World War II remained by far the single greatest responsibility of the infantry throughout the 1945-50 period and was a heavy drain on the Army's overall effort. ”

“ Although the first problem of the postwar infantry was demobilization, even while that was going on plans were being made for the reorganization of infantry units in the light of the experience gained and the lessons learned during World War II. Since the war had been won and infantry organization, weapons, and tactics had proved to be effective in different theaters of operations and against different enemy forces, there was no motivation for radical innovations. ”

“ There were ten men in the 1948 armored infantry rifle squad-one more than in its regular infantry counterpart. The tenth man drove the squad's newly issued full-tracked armored utility vehicle, M44, which replaced the half-track personnel carrier used during World War II. The basic weapons of the standard infantry and the armored infantry were the same, although the quantity of the weapons varied. Armored infantry units, however, were not authorized any recoilless rifles. ”