John McLean, Ross v. Duval — Opinion of the Court
“ It is a sound principle, that where a statute of limitations prescribes the time within which suit shall be brought or an act done, and a part of the time has elapsed, effect may be given to the act; and the time yet to run, being a reasonable part of the whole time, will be considered the limitation in the mind of the legislature, in such cases. ”
John McLean, Ross v. Duval — Opinion of the Court
“ It is not, therefore, an act to regulate process. Executions are named in the act, and are authorised to be issued under certain circumstances, within a limited time: but this is only another mode of limiting the judgment; and is strictly and technically as much a limitation on the judgment, as is imposed in the first part of the same section in reference to a scire facias or action of debt. The act provides, that after the lapse of ten years from the rendition of a judgment, where no execution has been issued, neither an action of debt, nor a scire facias shall be brought on it. ”
John McLean, Ross v. Duval — Opinion of the Court
“ There is no evidence in the record that the Circuit Court of Virginia ever adopted any rule, which by a fair construction, could regulate executions. In this view, then, the case must stand upon the execution law of Virginia in 1789, adopted by the process acts. And under the decision in the above case of Wayman vs. Southard, it is clear that no subsequent changes in the process law of the state of Virginia, can be obligatory on the Circuit Court. ”
