John Paul Stevens

“ Thus, a State reasonably could decide that there is no need to enact a tolling statute applicable to such suits. Alternatively, a State reasonably might conclude that some inmates may be loathe to bring suit against adversaries to whose daily supervision and control they remain subject, or that inmates who do file may not have a fair opportunity to establish the validity of their allegations while they are confined. The Michigan tolling statute reflects a legislative decision to lessen any such difficulties by extending the time in which prisoners may seek recovery for constitutional injuries. ”

“ Concluding that quick disposition of § 1983 suits advances these latter policies, the court held that Michigan's tolling law is inconsistent with federal law and declined to apply it.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. A State's decision to toll the statute of limitations during the inmate's disability does not frustrate § 1983's compensation goal. Rather, it enhances the inmate's ability to bring suit and recover damages for injuries. [12] Nor does the State's decision to toll its statute of limitations hinder § 1983's deterrence interest. ”

“ Since 1846, however, the Michigan Legislature has enacted provisions tolling the onset of limitations periods for prisoners and others suffering from legal disabilities. [7] The contemporary counterpart provides:
" [I] f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action is under 18 years of age, insane, or imprisoned at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run." ”