John Paul Stevens

“ The interest in a rigid interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity outweighs the interest in equitable treatment of general creditors and shareholders of the corporate debtor. This result is neither necessary nor just.
It is not necessary because both the text and the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code support a contrary result. It is not just because nothing more than a misguided interest in adherence to obsolete judge-made rules is at stake. I shall comment first on the laws enacted by Congress and then on the rules that the Court itself has ordained. ”

“ As representative governments attempt to ameliorate inequalities as necessities permit, prerogatives of the government yield to the needs of the citizen.... When authority is given, it is liberally construed." United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) .
In the bankruptcy context, the Court has noted that there is no reason why the Federal Government should be treated [p. 44] differently from any other secured creditor. [13] Its interests are adequately protected by specific statutory provisions governing discharges and priorities. ”

“ The legislative history unambiguously demonstrates that Congress intended the statute to be read literally. The immediate purpose of §106 (c) was to enable the bankruptcy court to determine the amount and the dischargeability of the debtor's tax liabilities, but the sponsors of the amendment clearly stated that it covered "other matters as well," specifically including the avoidance of preferential transfers. 124 Cong. Rec. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ; id., at 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) . [3] The congressional purpose to waive sovereign immunity is pellucidly clear. ”