John Venn

“ Are we accurately conscious of gradations of belief?
5. Probability only concerned with part of this enquiry. 6. Difficulty of measuring our belief; 7. Owing to intrusion of emotions, 8. And complexity of the evidence. 9. And when measured, is it always correct? 10, 11. Distinction between logical and psychological views. 12—16. Analogy of Formal Logic fails to show that we can thus detach and measure our belief. 17. Apparent evidence of popular language to the contrary. 18. How is full belief justified in inductive enquiry? ”

“ The data of Probability are established by experience; 2. Though in practice most problems are solved deductively. 3—7. Mechanical instance to show the inadequacy of any à priori proof. 8. The Principle of Sufficient Reason inapplicable.
9. Evidence of actual experience. 10, 11. Further examination of the causes. 12, 13. Distinction between the succession of physical events and the Doctrine of Combinations. ”

“ Broad distinction between these views; 2, 3. Difficulty of adhering consistently to the objective view; 4. Especially in the case of Hypotheses. 5. The doubtful stage of our facts is only occasional in Inductive Logic. 6—9. But normal and permanent in Probability. 10, 11. Consequent difficulty of avoiding Conceptualist phraseology.
CHAPTER XII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISTINCTIONS OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER. §§ 1, 2. Probability has no relation to time. 3, 4. Butler and Mill on Probability before and after the event. ”