Summary

Joseph McKenna Burdick v. United States — Opinion of the Court

If it be objected that the sensitiveness of Burdick was extreme because his refusal to answer was itself an implication of crime, we answer, not necessarily in fact, not at all in theory of law. It supposed only a possibility of a charge of crime, and interposed protection against the charge, and, reaching beyond it, against furnishing what might be urged or used as evidence to support it.
This brings us to the differences between legislative immunity and a pardon. They are substantial. The latter carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it.
Source: Wikisource

Joseph McKenna Burdick v. United States — Opinion of the Court

It demonstrates by both the necessity of the acceptance of a pardon to its legal efficacy, and the court did not hesitate in decision, as we have seen, whatever the alternative of acceptance, whether it be death or lesser penalty. The contrast shows the right of the individual against the exercise of executive power not solicited by him nor accepted by him.
The principles declared in United States v. Wilson have endured for years; no case has reversed or modified them.
Source: Wikisource

Joseph McKenna Burdick v. United States — Opinion of the Court

It is to be borne in mind that the power of the President under the Constitution to grant pardons and the right of a witness must be kept in accommodation. Both have sanction in the Constitution, and it should, therefore, be the anxiety of the law to preserve both,-to leave to each its proper place. In this as in other conflicts between personal rights and the powers of government, technical-even nice distinctions are proper to be regarded. Granting, then, that the pardon was legally issued and was sufficient for immunity, it was Burdick's right to refuse it, as we have seen
Source: Wikisource

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